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DEFINING “ACCIDENTS” IN THE AIR:  
WHY TORT LAW PRINCIPLES 
ARE ESSENTIAL TO INTERPRET  
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION’S 
“ACCIDENT” REQUIREMENT 
Alexa West* 
 
Exceptions do not exist in a vacuum; in fact, exceptions to a principle are 
usually formed and understood using those principles to which they are an 
exception.  Even so, U.S. courts interpreting the accident requirement of the 
Montreal Convention—an exception to traditional tort law regarding 
injuries sustained during international air travel—fail to use tort law in 
evaluating whether certain situations meet the accident criteria.  
Consequentially, many decisions render airlines responsible for a 
passenger’s injuries where in the same circumstances any other premises 
owner would not be implicated.  This directly contradicts the intent of the 
Montreal Convention’s creators, who wanted to limit carrier liability to 
foster the airline industry’s viability.  Instead of interpreting “accident” to 
make carriers liable in a narrower set of circumstances and thereby protect 
airlines, courts are interpreting “accident” in a way that broadens the 
airlines’ responsibilities. 
This Note examines the history of, and the reasons for, the Montreal 
Convention, which in part forces airlines to indemnify passengers for 
injuries resulting from “accidents”—a term undefined in the treaty.  The 
Montreal Convention and the subsequent case law interpreting it 
demonstrate how, to qualify as an “accident,” the injury-producing 
incident must be causally connected to the plane’s operation.  Importantly, 
the causal connection’s adequacy should be evaluated according to 
American tort jurisprudence even though the accident requirement itself is 
an exception to general tort law.  This Note focuses on a particular type of 
injury-producing event, a copassenger tort, because of its interesting causal 
nature that exemplifies the contrast between decisions using tort law and 
those rendered under the Convention. 
  
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.S.F.S., 2013, Edmund A. 
Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.  Thank you to my fellow Law 
Review members for their guidance and keen eyes, and to my father, mother, sister, and 
grandfather Jerome Leitner, for their love, enthusiasm, and unwavering support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Brandi Wallace expected her flight from Seoul, South Korea, to Los 
Angeles, California, to be routine.  After consuming a meal, having a drink, 
and reading her book, Wallace fell asleep in her window seat.1  According 
to the standard procedure for long flights, the lights in the cabin were 
dimmed to help passengers adjust to time changes and ensure their 
comfort.2  Some time later, Wallace awoke to find that Kwang-Yong Park, 
the passenger seated beside her, had undone her belt while she was asleep, 
unzipped her pants, and put his hand inside her underwear to fondle her 
 
 1. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Korean Air Lines Co. v. Wallace, 531 U.S. 
1144 (2001) (No. 00-560). 
 2. See Andrei Ciobanu, Saving the Airlines:  A Narrower Interpretation of the Term 
“Accident” in Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, 31 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 1, 17 
(2006) (“Darkening the cabin on long flights is necessary for the passengers’ comfort.”). 
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private parts.3  Wallace reported the incident to a Korean Airlines 
crewmember, and the crewmember assigned Wallace a new seat 
immediately.4  Park was arrested upon arrival in Los Angeles.5 
This sexual assault is an example of a copassenger tort,6 when one 
passenger on a flight injures another passenger or causes another passenger 
to be injured.  The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air (“the Montreal Convention” or “the 
Convention”) is an international treaty that governs the existence and 
amount of an air carrier’s liability for passenger injuries sustained on 
international flights, including those resulting from copassenger torts.7  The 
Convention premises injuries for which the airline can be liable on whether 
that injury was caused by an “accident” within the meaning of the treaty.8  
Yet “accident” is not explicitly defined in the document, and this ambiguity 
forces U.S. courts to apply a heavily fact-based inquiry as to whether 
certain occurrences are “accidents” under the Convention.  This creates a 
body of U.S. law regarding international air carrier liability that leaves both 
plaintiffs and airlines uncertain as to what claims will succeed in court.9 
Prior to the incident described above, Park did not act suspiciously, the 
crew did not notice any unusual behavior, and Wallace did not alert or 
complain to the attendants about Park.10  Korean Air could not have 
prevented the sexual assault, because it could not possibly have foreseen its 
occurrence.  Even so, and even though Wallace herself conceded that the 
assault was not caused “by a lack of due care on the part of” Korean Air,11 
the Second Circuit found the airline liable for Wallace’s assault.12  Using 
 
 3. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Recently, there has been growing concern about sexual assaults on airplanes. See 
Karen Schwartz, Recent Incidents Put a New Focus on Sexual Assault on Airplanes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/travel/recent-incidents-put-a-
new-focus-on-sexual-assault-on-airplanes.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-
iphone-share&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/347J-WV3R]. 
 7. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by 
Air, May 28, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-45 (2000) [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. 
 8. See id. art. 17; see also Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 398–99 (1985) (“[The treaty] 
specified that air carriers would be liable if an accident caused the passenger’s injury.” 
(emphasis omitted)); Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 382 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[The 
Convention] held carriers liable in the event of an accident.”). 
 9. As one scholar put it, contemplating the meaning of an article 17 accident has 
become “a metaphysical exercise roughly equivalent to contemplating the number of angels 
that may dance on the head of a pin.” Louise Cobbs, The Shifting Meaning of ‘Accident’ 
Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention:  What Did the Airline Know and What Did It 
Do About It?, 24 AIR & SPACE L. 121, 121 (1999). 
 10. See Wallace v. Korean Air, No. 98 Civ. 1039 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999). 
 11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 4. 
 12. See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000).  This precedent, 
holding airlines liable for injuries caused by incidents wholly out of their control, essentially 
imposes strict liability on the airlines for any injuries resulting on international flights, which 
is neither the intention of the Warsaw Convention’s creators nor consistent with other 
American law. See SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW:  
OCTOBER 4–12, 1929, WARSAW 49 (Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans., 1975) 
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particularized and inconsistent precedent, the Second Circuit found that 
Wallace’s sexual assault was an “accident” as defined by the Montreal 
Convention.13  In analogous cases, however, courts have not found 
premises owners liable where the same conduct occurred in a bus, bar, boat, 
or other on-ground premises.14 
This challenges one’s traditional sense of justice, as it contradicts 
American jurisprudence’s embodiment of the ethical assumption that one 
should be liable only for injuries one has caused or has a duty to prevent.15  
In conjunction with this tenet is that one has a duty only to prevent harms 
one can reasonably foresee.16  The Second Circuit’s decision circumvented 
these foundational principles of American tort law by neglecting to use 
them in its inquiry of the sufficiency of the causal connection of the assault 
to the operation of the aircraft. 
This Note argues that, although the accident threshold in the Montreal 
Convention for air carrier liability was included to be an exception to tort 
law principles,17 tort principles still are necessary to interpret the accident 
requirement.  Accidents must be causally connected to the operation of the 
aircraft,18 and the sufficiency of this causal connection must be interpreted 
in light of American tort principles to fulfill the intent of the Montreal 
Convention’s drafters and to align Montreal Convention decisions with 
American jurisprudence’s inherent sense of justice regarding who should be 
liable for negligence and injuries. 
 
[hereinafter WARSAW MINUTES] (noting British representative to the Warsaw Convention Sir 
Alfred Dennis’s statement that “it is therefore not just to impose absolute liability upon the 
carrier”). 
 13. See Wallace, 214 F.3d at 300. 
 14. See, e.g., Jaffess v. Home Lines, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 7365 (MJL), 1988 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3481 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1988) (finding cruise ship owners not liable for a 
passenger’s sexual assault while on the ship).  In Jaffess, the court was following Supreme 
Court precedent laid out in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 
625, 632 (1959), in which the Court held “the owner of a ship in navigable waters 
owes . . . the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances.”  The Second 
Circuit had reaffirmed this precedent specifically regarding passengers on ships. See 
Monteleone v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 838 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1988); Rainey v. Pacquet 
Cruises, Inc., 709 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1983).  Under the particular circumstances in 
Jaffess—a sexual assault on a cruise ship’s passenger—the court found that “[i]f anything, 
sexual assault seems less likely to occur on ships than on land” because assailants on land 
have the opportunity to “flee the vicinity, while persons on ships cannot.” Jaffess, 1988 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3481, at *11.  Therefore, the court found the premises owner had exercised 
“reasonable care” and refused to hold it liable for the sexual assault. See id. at *10. 
 15. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (noting that 
the purpose of tort law is to “punish wrongdoers”); see also William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 861–62 (1981) 
(“[I]f asked what tort law is based upon, most tort lawyers would answer that it is based 
upon notions of justice, equity, fairness, or morality.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (noting that if 
people were liable “without suspicion of the danger,” then “[l]ife will have to be made over, 
and human nature transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as . . . the 
customary standard to which behavior must conform”). 
 17. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 13 (“[T]he Warsaw Convention was meant to 
distinguish between traditional tort injuries and aircraft-related injuries.”). 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
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Part I of this Note examines the history of the Montreal Convention and 
focuses on the reasons for its implementation.  It explains how the Warsaw 
Convention was passed in 1929 to protect the young airline industry from 
liability levels that could threaten its viability.19  Ultimately, these goals 
went unmet as numerous amendments stripped the Convention of its 
uniformity and easy applicability.  To fix this confusion, the signatories to 
the Warsaw Convention met in 1999 and created the Montreal Convention, 
which superseded the original convention and sought to fix these issues. 
Part II then explains current American jurisprudence under the Montreal 
Convention and courts’ reasoning in labeling certain happenings as 
“accidents.”  Part II also considers the current state of copassenger torts 
under American precedent.20 
Part III reexamines the Convention’s legislative history and the operative 
U.S. cases interpreting the word “accident” to prove that a causal 
connection to the aircraft is necessary for an incident to be an “accident.”  
Part III also advocates for the use of American tort principles to analyze the 
validity of an alleged accident’s causal connection to the aircraft’s 
operation.  Using tort principles to decide whether the causal connection is 
sufficient to render airlines liable facilitates the intent of the creators of the 
Convention, the purpose of U.S. tort law, and the foundational sense of 
morality that underpins the American legal system.  Finally, Part III 
attempts to draw the line at what kinds of copassenger torts are accidents by 
focusing on what connections these torts must have to the aircraft’s 
operation and the sufficiency of these connections under traditional tort law. 
I.  A HISTORY OF AIR CARRIER LIABILITY 
FOR INJURIES ON INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS 
Commercial air travel is how our increasingly globalized society shares 
persons and resources.  In less than one hundred years, air travel has gone 
from nonexistence to transporting 3.5 billion people in 2015.21  That is 
almost half of the world’s population.22  Commercial air travel is integral to 
the world’s economy:  consumers spend 1 percent of world GDP on air 
transport, and airlines and their customers generate around $116 billion in 
 
 19. See infra Part I.A. 
 20. Thus far, American courts have been reluctant to contribute to the “Talmudic 
debate” of whether all copassenger torts are accidents under the Warsaw Convention. See 
Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Happily, this Talmudic debate is 
academic in the unique circumstances of this case.  Indeed, we have no occasion to decide 
whether all co-passenger torts are necessarily accidents for purposes of the Convention.”).  
In addition, examining what is and is not an “accident” under the Warsaw Convention 
through the lens of copassenger torts will help clarify the scope of the Warsaw Convention’s 
liability and better align current Montreal Convention jurisprudence with previous precedent 
and the intent of the treaty’s drafters. Id.; see also infra Part II.C. 
 21. IATA, ANNUAL REVIEW 2016, at 55 (2016), http://www.iata.org/publications/ 
Documents/iata-annual-review-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FEF-R7WF]. 
 22. See Current World Population, WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/ 
world-population/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/BPF4-DS7C]. 
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tax revenue for governments around the globe.23  Despite this, the 
commercial airline industry is economically fragile24 and needs insulation 
from crippling financial loss through certain limitations on liability.25  One 
such protective device is the Montreal Convention, an international treaty 
governing the liability of air carriers for injuries that occur onboard 
aircrafts.26 
The Montreal Convention’s predecessor, the Warsaw Convention,27 
prioritized protecting the then-nascent airline industry.28  Understanding the 
creators’ objectives and concerns are essential to properly interpret 
Montreal Convention “accidents.”29  Accordingly, Part I traces the history 
of the Montreal Convention, its structure, and its main goals of unifying 
liability standards and limiting liability for air carriers.  Part I.A reviews the 
intentions of the Warsaw Convention’s creators and the purposes for its 
creation.  Part I.B examines the Montreal Convention, the purposes for 
rewriting international air carrier liability standards, and what—if 
anything—changed between the two Conventions. 
 
 23. See IATA, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 2 (2015), 
https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/IATA-Economic-Performance-of-
the-Industry-mid-year-2015-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBR6-K63Z]. 
 24. See, e.g., Karen Walker, The IATA Forecasts Record 2015, 2016 Airline Profits, but 
Cautions on Regional Disparity, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD (Dec. 10, 2015), http:// 
atwonline.com/airlines/iata-forecasts-record-2015-2016-airline-profits-cautions-regional-
disparity (noting “backwards steps” in airline profitability, “drop[s] in year-over-year 
profitability,” and the head of the International Air Transport Association’s observation that 
“large parts of the [airline] industry are still struggling”) [https://perma.cc/7MWJ-SYK8].  
As recently as 2015, the “fragility of the [commercial airline] industry’s profitability might 
come as a surprise.” Tony Tyler, Dir. Gen., IATA, Remarks at 71st Annual General Meeting 
of International Air Transportation Association Curtain Raiser Press Conference (June 4, 
2015), http://iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/2015-06-04-01.aspx [https://perma.cc/RZ 
D8-7U67]; see also Nisha Ramchandani, Global Carriers Cruise Towards Record Year but 
Profits Remain Fragile, BUS. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/ 
transport/global-carriers-cruise-towards-record-year-but-profits-remain-fragile-iata 
(observing Director General Tyler’s remarks that “[t]he industry’s results . . . are not 
outstanding when compared to the profits that are generated in other parts of the global 
economy”) [https://perma.cc/V9BY-HNKX]. 
 25. The head of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has made a plea to 
government leaders asking them to be “keen to support aviation’s financial health” with 
strategies including liability-limiting regulations. Tony Tyler, Dir. Gen., IATA, Report on 
the Air Transport Industry (June 8, 2015), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/ 
2015-06-08-01.aspx [https://perma.cc/7YHJ-HS9T]. 
 26. See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 7. 
 27. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1929) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. 
 28. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the 
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499 (1967) (“The second goal—clearly 
recognized to be the more important one—was to limit the potential liability of the carrier in 
case of accidents.”). 
 29. These concerns still exist today, almost one hundred years after the Warsaw 
Convention originally attempted to address them. 
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A.  The Warsaw Convention:  Objectives and Liabilities 
Thirty nations met in Warsaw, Poland, on October 4, 1929, to create 
uniform international air carrier liability standards.30  As one scholar put it, 
for the first time, an industry was going to “link many lands with different 
languages, customs, and legal systems,” so lawmakers desired “at the 
outset, a certain degree of uniformity.”31  A uniform system would make it 
easier for all parties involved in civil airline litigation—claimants, carriers, 
and governments—to know their rights and responsibilities and the origins 
of those rights and obligations.32 
A second paramount objective of the conference was to foster industry 
growth by limiting international air carrier liability for personal injury, 
death, and property damage.33  In the late 1920s, commercial air travel was 
still an emerging industry.34  Limited liability would ensure the young 
industry’s development, create predictable guidelines for airlines to secure 
insurance, and stabilize the industry’s operating costs.35  Air carriers—
 
 30. See PAUL B. LARSEN ET AL., AVIATION LAW:  CASES, LAWS AND RELATED SOURCES 
267–73 (2006). 
 31. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 498.  The resulting treaty’s preamble 
echoes this sentiment, stating the signatories “recognized the advantage of regulating in a 
uniform manner the conditions of . . . the liability of the carrier.” Warsaw Convention, supra 
note 27, at 3014; see also Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516 U.S. 217, 230 (1996) 
(“Undoubtedly it was a primary function of the Warsaw Convention to foster uniformity in 
the law of international air travel.”); Potter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 
1996) (“A primary function of the Warsaw Convention is to foster uniformity in the laws 
governing international air carrier liability.”); see also Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 
1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The Warsaw Convention was designed to effectuate two 
central public policy goals:  (1) to establish uniformity . . . as to documentation, and (2) to 
limit air carriers’ potential liability in the event of accidents.”). 
 32. See Potter, 98 F.3d at 885 (“Uniformity with respect to liability is required in order 
to allow airlines to raise the capital needed to expand operations and to provide a definite 
basis upon which their insurance rates can be calculated.”); M. Veronica Pastor, Absolute 
Liability Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention:  Where Does It Stop?, 26 GEO. WASH. 
J. INT’L L. & ECON. 575, 576 (1993) (noting absent an international treaty, conflict of law 
rules would apply to disputes arising from injuries on flights, and this system “would be 
complicated, often confusing, and . . . would result in wide discrepancies in recovery and 
liabilities for parties involved in a single incident”). 
 33. See Saks v. Air Fr., 724 F.2d 1383, 1386 (1984) (“It is believed that the principle of 
limitation of liability will not only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a 
more definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will also prove 
to be an aid in the development of international air transportation” (quoting Message from 
the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 73rd Cong. 3–4 (1934) (statement 
of Secretary of State Cordell Hull))), rev’d, 470 U.S. 392; see also 7 GEORGE N. TOMPKINS, 
JR., LIABILITY RULES APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS DEVELOPED 
BY THE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES:  FROM WARSAW 1929 TO MONTREAL 1999, at 3 
(2006). 
 34. The total airline operations between 1925 and 1929, in both domestic and 
international travel, were only 400 million passenger miles. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, 
supra note 28, at 498. 
 35. See Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., No. M-82-3057, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17951, at *2–3 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 1983) (“[T]he Convention sought to limit the potential 
liability of the air carrier so as to aid in the development of international air transportation, to 
provide a definite basis for insurance rates for airlines, and thereby to reduce operating 
expenses with subsequent savings to the airline industry and its passengers.”). 
1472 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
which, before the conference, attempted to require passengers to 
contractually accept a reduced or nonexistent level of carrier liability as a 
condition of air travel36—were worried about compensating accident 
victims who could threaten to bankrupt their business.37 
The resulting treaty, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Transportation by Air, known as “the Warsaw 
Convention,” became law in 1933.38  It governed “the international carriage 
of passengers, baggage, and cargo by air, and regulat[ed] the liability of 
international air carriers in over 120 nations.”39  Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention addressed international air carrier liability for personal injury or 
death.  It stated: 
The carrier [is] liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or 
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a 
passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took 
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking or disembarking.40 
An airline’s liability was premised upon an accident causing the 
claimant’s injury.41  Read alone, article 17 confers strict liability upon 
airlines when an accident happens.  However, as one scholar notes, “Article 
17 is written in a way that clearly indicates that the clauses and parts of the 
article are to be read as an inter-connecting part to a larger more intricate 
whole.”42  Therefore, this strict liability must be read in line with the 
Warsaw Convention’s other liability qualifying articles. 
Article 17 created a presumption of liability on the air carriers unless they 
could prove they had taken all “necessary measures to avoid the damage,”43 
 
 36. See WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 47.  Purchasing a ticket secured this 
arrangement. 
 37. See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971) (“The most 
important purpose of the Warsaw Conference was the protection of air carriers from the 
crushing consequences of a catastrophic accident, a protection thought necessary for the 
economic health of the then emerging industry.”); see also Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 3; 
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 499 (“It was expected that [the Convention’s 
limitation of liability] . . . would enable airlines to attract capital that might otherwise be 
scared away by the fear of a single catastrophic accident.”).  This threat still exists today 
because of the airline industry’s vulnerable state:  as recently as July 2015, the rate of 
expected rise in the airline industry’s profitability has fallen; in addition, profit expectations 
have dipped dramatically. See IATA, AIRLINE BUSINESS CONFIDENCE INDEX:  JULY 2015 
SURVEY (2015) https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/bcs-jul-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K3AC-9V37]. 
 38. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 27. 
 39. Loryn B. Zerner, Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines and Article 25 of the Warsaw 
Convention:  A Cloud Left Unchartered, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1245, 1249 (1999). 
 40. Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 17 (emphasis added). 
 41. See id.; see also Howard Sokol, Final Boarding Call—The Warsaw Convention’s 
Exclusivity and Preemption of State Law Claims in International Air Travel:  El Al Israel 
Airlines v. Tseng, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 227, 237 (2000) (“Deciding whether an accident 
has occurred conclusively determines whether Article 17 applies.”); supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
 42. Sokol, supra note 41, at 236 n.75. 
 43. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 20. 
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whereby article 20 allowed them to avoid liability entirely.44  When an 
article 17 accident was found to have occurred, article 22 created a 
monetary recovery limit of $8,300.45  The carrier also could limit damages 
with a contributory negligence defense, embodied in article 21.46  The only 
time a claimant could recover more than the Warsaw Convention’s 
monetary limit was upon a showing of “willful misconduct” on the part of 
the carrier.47 
Essentially, the Warsaw Convention drew a fault-based line on personal 
injury liability:  if the airline negligently caused the accident, the claimant 
could recover only up to the monetary limit; if the airline willfully caused 
the accident, the claimant had unlimited recovery.  However, the Warsaw 
Convention did not make the airline liable for accidents wholly outside the 
carrier’s control;48 as stated at the Warsaw gathering, “[The objective is] 
just not to impose absolute liability upon the carrier but to relieve him of all 
liability when he has taken reasonable and normal measures to avoid 
damage:  This is the diligence which one can demand of the reasonable 
man.”49 
After the Warsaw Convention’s implementation, many signatories found 
the $8,300 liability limit too low to justly compensate accident victims.50  
Air safety improvements made it easier for carriers to obtain low-cost 
insurance (lessening their need for legislative protections), lawsuits for 
accidents on airlines were consistently asking for damages exceeding the 
Warsaw limit, and a political and academic contention that international air 
carriers were no longer entitled to special protection began gaining 
attention.51  The 1955 Hague Protocol, attempting to address these issues, 
doubled the monetary limit on recoverable damages for article 17 
accidents.52  It was the first of numerous amendments to the Warsaw 
Convention over the next forty years, ultimately rendering the Warsaw 
Convention unwieldy.53 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. art. 22. 
 46. See id. art. 21. 
 47. See id. art. 25. 
 48. See id. art. 20. 
 49. WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 49 (statement of Sir Alfred Dennis, British 
representative to the Warsaw Convention). 
 50. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 20,164 (1965) (statement of Sen. Robert Kennedy) (“No 
one questions the fact that the protection now afforded international travelers is woefully 
inadequate.”); see also Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 n.4 
(9th Cir. 1977) (noting how the United States denounced the Warsaw Convention because of 
the low damages limit). 
 51. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 504; see also, e.g., Aleksander 
Tobolewski, Against Limitation of Liability, A Radical Proposal, 3 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 
261, 264–67 (1978) (arguing for strict liability for torts occurring on an aircraft). 
 52. See TOMPKINS, supra note 33, at 5. 
 53. The Warsaw Convention was next amended by the 1961 Guadalajara Supplementary 
Convention.  Its purpose was to make the liability rules of the Warsaw Convention and 
Hague Protocol applicable to both the actual carrier and the contracting carrier when the 
actual carrier was not a “successive carrier” under the Warsaw Convention’s definition. See 
id. at 8.  The 1966 Montreal Agreement and the 1971 Guatemala Protocol were further 
efforts to achieve uniform liability systems and created a higher carrier liability damages 
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B.  The Montreal Convention:  
Broadening Carrier Liability Standards 
and Shifting Their Bases 
The Warsaw Convention and its supplemental amendments became 
convoluted and far from uniform.54  In order to unify the previous forty 
years’ piecemeal amendments, representatives from 118 countries and 
eleven international organizations met in Montreal in May 1999.55  The 
International Civil Aviation Organization’s then-president stated at the 
opening of the Montreal conference: 
[The Warsaw Convention’s] complexity has been further extended by 
adding additional rules . . . .  The result of these uncoordinated efforts is 
an increasingly opaque legal framework whose usefulness . . . has become 
a matter of growing concern, and it is the shared desire of the parties 
involved that legal certainty and uniformity be restored, while 
implementing, in a globally-coordinated fashion, the long overdue 
modernization and consolidation of the [Warsaw] system.56 
This testimony echoes the Montreal Convention’s creators’ prioritization of 
uniform and easy to follow international air liability standards. 
A second goal of the Montreal Convention’s creators was to reflect the 
amending provisions in their expansion of air carrier liability.57  The 
Montreal Convention’s article 17 addressed air carrier liabilities for 
personal death or injuries on flights, just as it did in the Warsaw 
 
threshold. See LARSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at 272–73.  The Montreal Protocol of 1975 
updated the existing liability limits for death or injury by translating the damage limit 
provision from the gold standard to another currency measure, “Special Drawing Rights” 
(SDRs).  The International Monetary Fund had created the SDR in the wake of abandoning 
the gold standard. See id.  Finally, in 1998, IATA created a contractual arrangement of 
airlines to withdraw from the 1966 Montreal agreement and to create a new language on 
tickets; carrier signatories agreed not to invoke the monetary limit of damages arising under 
article 17 and the nonfault defense of article 20(1) for claims under 100,000 SDRs. See id. at 
274. 
 54. See Runwantissa Abeyratne, The Economy Class Syndrome and Air Carrier 
Liability, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 271 (2001) (noting that the Warsaw Convention “did not 
succeed in presenting to the world unequivocally objective and quantified rules of liability,” 
thus precluding “a plaintiff from knowing that he would be, as a rule, compensated if he is 
injured in an air accident”). 
 55. See TOMPKINS, supra note 33, at 27. 
 56. 1 INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW:  
MONTREAL, 10–28, MAY 1999, at 37 (1999); see also Milestones in International Civil 
Aviation, ICAO, http://www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/Milestones-in-International-
Civil-Aviation.aspx (noting that when the Montreal Convention came into effect on 
November 4, 2003, ICAO Council President Assad Kotaite remarked, “Victims of 
international air accidents and their families will be better protected and compensated under 
the new Montreal Convention, which modernizes and consolidates a seventy-five year old 
system of international instruments of private international law into one legal instrument”) 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/G579-NVKE]. 
 57. See Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(noting that the Montreal Convention “represents a significant shift away from a treaty that 
primarily favored airlines to one that continues to protect airlines from crippling liability, but 
shows increased concern for the rights of passengers” by broadening carrier liability). 
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Convention.58  The Warsaw Convention’s presumption of air carrier 
liability remained in Montreal’s article 17, but the damages cap was 
significantly increased (from $8,300 to 100,000 “Special Drawing Rights” 
(SDRs), an international reserve asset the International Monetary Fund 
created, equivalent to approximately $135,000).59  It also stripped air 
carriers of any defense in actions under 100,000 SDRs.60  The carrier could 
escape claims over 100,000 SDRs only if it could prove that factors other 
than its negligence, like a third party’s act, caused the damages.61  Whereas 
the Warsaw Convention had divided its two tiers of recovery based on fault, 
the Montreal Convention did so monetarily.62 
Significantly, for the first time in aviation law, plaintiffs could recover 
unlimited damages for negligence claims.63  The Department of 
Transportation’s under secretary for policy found this elimination of “all 
artificial monetary limits on recoveries from the airline for proven damages 
with respect to the death or injury of a passenger during an international 
airline mishap” a cornerstone of the new treaty, and he made sure to point it 
out when urging the Senate to include the United States as a Montreal 
Convention signatory.64 
Yet, despite its newly aligned purposes and liability parameters, there 
were no substantive changes in the liability-inducing provision of the 
Montreal Convention (still article 17).65  Because of the lack of substantive 
 
 58. See Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 17 (“The carrier is liable for damage 
sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the 
accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of 
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”).  Although there were slight changes 
in language—the Montreal Convention’s “in case of death or bodily injury” replaced the 
Warsaw Convention’s “in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other 
bodily injury”—no substantive liability changes were made. Compare Montreal Convention, 
supra note 7, art. 17, with Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 17; infra note 65 and 
accompanying text. 
 59. See Larry Moore, The New Montreal Liability Convention, Major Changes in 
International Air Law:  An End to the Warsaw Convention, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 223, 
227 (2001). 
 60. See Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 21.  By contrast, the Warsaw 
Convention allowed a carrier to escape liability at any monetary damage level if it could 
prove it had taken all necessary measures to prevent the damage or that those measures were 
impossible. See LARSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at 275. 
 61. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 5. 
 62. See id. (“[U]nder the Montreal Convention, there is no longer any distinction 
between limited and unlimited liability based on the plaintiff’s cause of action.  Instead, the 
distinction arises from the amount of damages that the plaintiff can prove.”). 
 63. See Allan I. Mendelsohn & Renée Lieux, The Warsaw Convention Article 28, the 
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, and the Foreign Plaintiff, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 75, 110 
(2003).  In other words, there is a limit to the finding of liability, but in some circumstances, 
there is no limit to the amount of recovery once the airline is found liable. 
 64. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-8 (2003) (statement of Hon. Jeffrey N. Shane). 
 65. See Doe v. Etihad Airways, No. 13-14358, 2015 WL 5936326, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 
Oct. 13, 2015) (“The Montreal Convention superseded the Warsaw Convention, but retained 
many of the Warsaw Convention’s substantive provisions.”); see also Andrew Field, Air 
Travel, Accidents and Injuries:  Why the New Montreal Convention Is Already Outdated, 28 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 69, 78–79 (2005) (“The Montreal Convention was not altered in any 
significant way with regard to the criteria by which a claim can be made for death or 
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changes between the two treaties, most U.S. courts continued to interpret 
article 17 in the same way they had under the Warsaw Convention; as the 
Ninth Circuit observed, “in interpreting the Montreal Convention, courts 
have routinely relied upon Warsaw Convention precedent where the 
equivalent provision in the Montreal Convention is substantively the 
same.”66 
In the Montreal Convention, international air carrier liability continued to 
be premised upon an accident occurring, and “accident” continued to be 
undefined in the treaty.67  Due to this remaining definitional uncertainty, 
U.S. courts defining the term “accident” have had to interpret the 
Convention’s plain language and legislative history, creating inconsistent 
and heavily fact-based precedent. 
II.  HOW THE UNITED STATES INTERPRETS “ACCIDENT”:  
AIR FRANCE V. SAKS 
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that, alone, article 17’s language 
was “stark and undefined” and thus granted certiorari in 1985 in Air France 
v. Saks68 to resolve the conflict “as to the proper definition of the word 
‘accident’ as used in [the Warsaw] treaty.”69  The Court examined the 
Warsaw Convention’s article 17 because the Montreal Convention had not 
yet been written or ratified.70  After examining the treaty’s plain language 
(in its original French), legislative history, and subsequent interpretations in 
both U.S. and foreign courts, the Court defined “accident” as an 
“unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the 
passenger.”71 
Part II.A looks at the Supreme Court’s rationale in defining “accident,” 
and Part II.B explains the confusion surrounding the definition.  Saks has 
proven to be inadequate in instructing U.S. courts as to whether certain 
 
injury. . . .  [I]t would appear that the 1929 conception of claims will remain for some time to 
come.”). 
 66. Narayanan v. British Airways, 747 F.3d 1125, 1127 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014); see also 
Doe, 2015 WL 5936326, at *1 (“Courts routinely look to legal precedent interpreting the 
Warsaw Convention for substantively equivalent provisions of the Montreal Convention.”); 
PAUL S. DEMPSEY & MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIABILITY:  THE 
MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999, at 7 (2005) (noting that the Montreal Convention’s 
drafters “tried, wherever possible, to embrace the language of the original Warsaw 
Convention and its various Protocols, with the purpose of not disrupting the existing 
jurisprudence . . . .  Thus, the ‘common law’ of the Warsaw jurisprudence is vitally 
important to understanding the meaning of the Montreal Convention.”). But see Sven Brise, 
Economic Implications of Changing Passenger Limits in the Warsaw Liability System, 22 
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 121, 129 (1992) (arguing that the Montreal Convention’s changes 
are enough to mandate replacement of Warsaw Convention case law). 
 67. See Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 17. 
 68. 470 U.S. 392 (1985). 
 69. Id. at 394; accord Janice Cousins, Note, Warsaw Convention—Air Carrier Liability 
for Passenger Injuries Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 388 (1976). 
 70. Since the two conventions’ “accident” articles are essentially the same, see supra 
note 58, the court’s interpretation can be used for both liability limiting treaties, see supra 
note 66 and accompanying text. 
 71. Saks, 470 U.S. at 405. 
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situations—in particular, whether certain copassenger torts—are 
“accidents” under the Montreal Convention.  The resulting confusion and 
the inconsistent rulings it creates undermine the U.S. legal system’s pride in 
predictability,72 making it difficult for airlines to predict the outcome of 
particular cases to adequately insure themselves.  Further, it makes injured 
consumers unsure as to whether they will be able to recover damages.  In 
addition, the Saks definition leaves air carriers virtually unprotected from 
liability, a result in stark contrast with the entire Montreal Convention’s 
intent.73  Finally, Part II.C looks at the current state of copassenger torts 
under this uncertain interpretation regime. 
A.  Saks and the “Unusual or Unexpected” Measure 
After a flight from Paris to Los Angeles, Valerie Saks brought suit 
against Air France, alleging the plane’s depressurization during the flight 
caused her hearing loss.74  Saks’s claim rested on asserting the plane’s 
depressurization was a Warsaw Convention article 17 accident.75  Air 
France moved for summary judgment on the basis that the pressurization 
system’s normal operation was not an “accident” under the Warsaw 
Convention.76  While Saks urged the Court to define an article 17 accident 
as a “hazard of air travel,” the airline contended an article 17 accident 
should be defined as “an unusual or unexpected occurrence.”77 
The Supreme Court began by examining the article’s plain language.78  
The Court acknowledged, “the word ‘accident’ is not a technical legal term 
with a clearly defined meaning” and therefore turned to its context within 
the Warsaw Convention.79  The Court noted that, whether written in French 
or English, the Warsaw Convention imposed article 17 liability for personal 
injuries on “accidents” whereas article 18 (defining the scope of air carrier 
liability for damage to cargo) imposed liability for damage to any checked 
 
 72. See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzschild, Keeping It Private, 25 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 215, 221 
(2006) (“[P]redictability ranks fairly high among [U.S.] legal virtues:  it is part of what 
people mean by the Rule of Law.”); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank C. Cross, Stability, 
Predictability and the Rule of Law:  Stare Decisis as Reciprocity Norm 1 (Mar. 26, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://law.utexas.edu/conferences/measuring/The%20Papers/ 
Rule%20of%20Law%20Conference.crosslindquist.pdf (noting that predictability “has a 
moral valence insofar as it assures that like cases will be treated equally” and that absent 
predictability, “citizens have difficulty managing their affairs effectively”) 
[https://perma.cc/3LRJ-Z7JC]. 
 73. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 74. Saks, 470 U.S. at 394. 
 75. Id. at 394–95. 
 76. Id. at 395. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 396–97. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.”); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 
1975) (“It seems elementary to us that the language employed in Article 17 must be the 
logical starting point.”). 
 79. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 398 (quoting Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co. [1903] AC 443 (HL) 
453 (appeal taken from Eng.)). 
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baggage or goods for “occurrences.”80  This differentiation in language 
indicated that the drafters understood accidents to be different than 
occurrences.81  The drafters must have considered some factor present in 
accidents and not present in occurrences significant enough to induce 
liability for injury to persons rather than to baggage.82  The Court identified 
this differentiating factor as the unusual or unexpected nature of accidents, 
as opposed to the typicality of occurrences.83 
In support of this finding, the Court looked to the Warsaw Convention’s 
legislative history, noting that “[t]he records of the negotiation of the 
Convention accordingly support what is evident from its text:  A 
passenger’s injury must be caused by an accident, and an accident must 
mean something different than an ‘occurrence’ on the plane.”84  The Court 
enumerated U.S. cases that, although employing a broad definition of 
“accident,” still refused to consider routine travel procedures that produced 
injuries as “accidents.”85  Finally, the Court considered sister signatories’ 
and U.S. courts’ interpretations of article 17 since the Warsaw 
Convention’s ratification.86  For example, the Court discussed a French 
legal opinion that held article 17 accidents embrace “causes of injuries that 
are fortuitous or unpredictable.”87 
Ultimately, the Court agreed with Air France that an accident is “an 
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger” 
and noted, “This definition should be flexibly applied after assessment of 
all the circumstances surrounding a passenger’s injuries.”88  The Court 
emphasized that it is the Court’s duty to “enforce the . . . treaties of the 
United States, whatever they might be, and . . . the Warsaw Convention 
remains the supreme law of the land.”89  Although the Supreme Court 
defined “accident,” the definition requires more clarification, as inconsistent 
“accident” interpretations continue in lower courts. 
 
 80. See id. at 397–98. 
 81. See id.; accord M. MILDE, THE PROBLEMS OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
CARRIAGE BY AIR 62 (1963). 
 82. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 397–98. 
 83. See id. at 399–400 (“The text of the Convention consequently suggests that the 
passenger’s injury must be caused by an unexpected or unusual event.”). 
 84. Id. at 403.  For a more detailed analysis of the Warsaw Convention’s legislative 
history, see infra Part III.A.2. 
 85. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 405. 
 86. See id. at 404 (“[T]he opinions of our sister signatories [are] entitled to considerable 
weight.” (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 57 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 
1978))); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The conduct of 
the parties subsequent to ratification of a treaty may, thus, be relevant in ascertaining the 
proper construction to accord the treaty’s various provisions.”). 
 87. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 404 (observing additionally that Swiss and German law 
construe “accidents” as a sudden event independent of the will of the carrier). 
 88. Id. at 405.  The Court also noted that this could expand air carrier liability to terrorist 
or hijacking activity as well as some copassenger torts. Id. 
 89. Id. at 406 (alterations in original) (quoting Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d 
Cir. 1977)). 
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B.  Post-Saks Areas of Controversy 
Regarding Article 17 Accidents 
Saks’s unusual or unexpected measure does not work as a complete 
indication of whether incidents are article 17 accidents.  Alone, the Saks 
inquiry is perspective based, focusing on the parties’ state of mind, which is 
not a clear, consistent, or even fair way to assess the air carrier’s fault.90  
For example, in Gotz v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,91 a passenger was injured 
when placing a heavy bag in an overhead bin because another passenger 
stood up, causing the plaintiff to move and hyperextend his arm.92  In this 
case, the man standing up was unexpected from the perspective of the 
passenger, but from the airline’s perspective, it was a normal and routine 
occurrence in airline operation.93  In addition, there was no possible way in 
which the airline could have prevented a man from standing up when he 
was allowed to move around the cabin.94  Implicating the carrier in this 
circumstance extends the carrier’s liability far past what the Warsaw 
Convention’s drafters intended.95 
Because of the uncertainty in Saks’s perspective-based inquiry, forums 
have since considered a number of criteria in addition to the unusualness or 
unexpectedness of an incident to determine what is and what is not an 
accident.  Some of these factors include (1) whether the incident was related 
to the normal aircraft or airline operations; (2) if the crew members were 
knowledgeable or complicit in the events surrounding the alleged accident; 
(3) fellow passengers’ acts; (4) the acts of third parties who are not crew or 
passengers (e.g., terrorists or hijackers); (5) the incident’s location; (6) the 
complainant’s role, reaction, or condition in connection with the occurrence 
at issue; and (7) the risks inherent in air travel.96  The two most frequently 
considered factors are whether the incident must be a “risk inherent in air 
 
 90. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 12 (“The answer to such a question is whatever courts 
desire it to be.  Further, judges are more likely to view these cases through the eyes of a 
consumer.”); see also Cobbs, supra note 9, at 123 (finding that after Saks, “the trend appears 
to be towards an even fuzzier definition more or less dependent on perspective”). 
 91. 12 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 92. See id. at 200. 
 93. See id.; accord Kruger v. United Airlines, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1010 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (ruling that a passenger swinging a bag and unintentionally hitting another 
passenger was an article 17 accident); Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 12. 
 94. See Gotz, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 200–01. 
 95. See WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 47. 
  What can one demand of the air carrier?  A normal organization of his 
operation, a judicious choice of his personnel, a constant surveillance of his agents 
and servants, a rigorous control of his aircraft, spare parts and raw material. 
  One must indeed admit that those who use aircraft are not ignorant of the risks 
inherent in a mode of transportation which has not yet attained the point of 
perfection that one hundred years has given to railroads. 
Id. at 49; supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 
see also Domenica DiGiacomo, The End of an Evolution:  From Air France v. Saks to 
Olympic Airways v. Husain—the Term “Accident” Under Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention Has Come Full Circle, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 409, 415 n.56 (2004); Judith R. 
Karp, Mile High Assaults:  Air Carrier Liability Under the Warsaw Convention, 66 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 1551, 1560 (2001). 
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travel”97 and if the incident was causally related to the operation of the 
aircraft.98 
Because Saks only addressed the “narrow issue [of] whether the 
respondent can meet [the article 17] burden by showing that her injury was 
caused by the normal operation of the aircraft’s pressurization system,”99 
judges are uncertain about which factors are relevant in the “accident” 
definition.100  For example, the Eastern District of New York held that a 
woman falling off of her shuttle bus to pick up her luggage in a separate 
area of the airport was an “accident” within the meaning of the Warsaw 
Convention.101  The court rejected the notion that an article 17 accident 
must be a “risk inherent in air travel” (which falling off of a bus certainly is 
not; in fact, it is more a risk inherent in ground travel) because that kind of 
inquiry would “necessarily involve courts in the ‘complicated, always fact 
laden, and irrelevant question of what constitutes a risk characteristic of air 
travel.’”102  However, the Southern District of New York held that a man 
being accused of smoking marijuana in an airplane restroom was not an 
“accident” solely because the situation was not an inherent air travel risk, 
noting, “[o]n the theory that hijackings and terrorist attacks are risks 
 
 97. Some courts have treated the accident’s relation to the risks inherent in air travel as 
paramount. See Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding 
no accident when a passenger’s hernia was aggravated due to the airline staff’s refusal to 
allow him to lay across seats because the denial was not a risk inherent in air travel); Pittman 
v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065, 1070–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing, after examining the 
legal precedent under article 17, that courts have focused on whether the alleged conduct 
constitutes a risk inherent in air travel, a criterion explaining why instances such as aircraft 
collisions and terrorist activities qualify as “accidents”); Curley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 846 F. 
Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (asserting that an international flight’s passenger being 
falsely accused of smoking marijuana in the restroom was not a characteristic air travel risk 
and was therefore not an article 17 accident).  Some court decisions have asserted that 
“accident” under article 17 need not be a risk inherent in air travel. See Girard v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., No. 00-CV-4559 (ERK), 2003 WL 21989978, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(holding that it is unnecessary for an injury to relate to risks characteristic of air travel); 
Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2001] EWCA (Civ) 790, [2002] QB 100 (Eng.) 
(asserting that the Supreme Court’s “accident” definition under Saks does not justify 
requiring an accident to have some relationship with an inherent air travel risk). 
 98. See Sethy v. Malev-Hungarian Airlines, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8722, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12606, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000) (holding that a trip and fall over another 
passenger’s bag on the plane’s floor was not an accident under article 17 because the 
incident did not relate to the operation of the aircraft or acts of the crew members); Gotz, 12 
F. Supp. 2d at 204 (stating expressly that the unusual event Saks requires must be an 
abnormal aircraft operation). But see Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 n.4 
(9th Cir. 1993) (stating that Saks did not indicate whether an accident must relate to aircraft 
operations); Barratt v. Trin. & Tobago (BWIA Int’l) Airways Corp., No. CV 88-3945 (RR), 
1990 WL 127590, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990) (finding that a passenger tripping and 
injuring herself on a staircase while on her way to board the plane was an article 17 accident, 
and stating that the definition of “accident” is “in no way limited to those injuries resulting 
from dangers exclusive to aviation”). 
 99. Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985); see also infra Part III.A.1. 
 100. See Cobbs, supra note 9, at 123 (“Because the Saks definition has left so much to the 
factual situation, cases since Saks have not arrived at any bright line rule . . . .”). 
 101. See Girard, 2003 WL 21989978. 
 102. See id. at *5 (quoting Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(Pooler, J., concurring)). 
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characteristic of air travel, liability . . . has been expanded to include[] 
injuries resulting from such attacks” and should not be expanded further.103 
Whether the “risk inherent in air travel”104 and “causal connection to 
aircraft operation” factors are considered essential creates two versions of 
the “accident” definition:  a narrow one, in which accidents must be (1) 
unusual or unexpected, (2) external to the passenger, (3) causally connected 
to an aircraft’s operation, and (4) a risk in inherent in air travel,105 and a 
broader one, where an accident is (1) unexpected or unusual and (2) 
external to the passenger, regardless of causal relation to the plane’s 
operation or of the occurrence being an inherent air travel risk.106  The 
broader definition, adopted by courts like the Ninth Circuit, essentially 
imposes strict liability on international air carriers for injuries on planes or 
while embarking or disembarking onto planes.107  Even courts using the 
narrower scopes of article 17 accidents stretch the scope of liability to a 
degree harmful to international air carriers and beyond the capacity to 
which the drafters of these conventions wanted to subject airlines.108  This 
is especially true regarding copassenger torts, where fact patterns are 
intricate and the airline’s involvement in the injury or its prevention 
requires more investigation than solely whether the tort was unusual or 
unexpected. 
C.  The Current State of Copassenger Torts Under Article 17 
Courts currently acknowledge that not all copassenger torts are article 17 
accidents, although some scholars insist they should be.109  Generally, 
courts have been disinclined to broaden article 17’s accident definition to 
 
 103. Curley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); accord 
Maxwell v. Aer Lingus Ltd., 122 F. Supp. 2d 210, 213 (D. Mass. 2000) (“Liability for 
injuries resulting from [the risk of terrorism] is allocated to the carrier for the simple reason 
that the carrier is in a far superior position than are passengers to institute protective 
safeguards.”). 
 104. Whether an article 17 accident must be a “risk inherent in air travel” is outside the 
scope of this Note.  The focus of this Note is on tort principles being used to interpret the 
causal connection requirement.  Yet, tort principles also should be used for the risk inherent 
requirement in the sense that whether a risk is inherent in air travel is causally connected to 
the air travel and that causal connection should be read in light of tort law.  However, the 
Saks Court seemingly rejected arguments that “accidents” “refer[] to any of the possible 
hazards of air travel.” Pastor, supra note 32, at 583; see also Saks, 470 U.S. at 396 
(disagreeing with the finding that “the Montreal [Convention] impose[s] absolute liability on 
airlines for injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air travel”). 
 105. See, e.g., Curley, 846 F. Supp. at 283. 
 106. See, e.g., Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 107. See infra notes 117, 122 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.C. 
 108. See infra Part III.A.  This is due to courts’ reluctance to use American tort principles 
in their interpretation of the narrowing requirements. See infra Part III.B. 
 109. See, e.g., Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 70 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Of 
course, not every tort committed by a fellow passenger is a Warsaw Convention accident.”). 
But see Blair J. Berkley, Warsaw Convention Claims Arising from Airline-Passenger 
Violence, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 499, 511 (2002) (“Characterizing passenger-
on-passenger assaults as Article 17 accidents, and imposing liability for injuries on airlines, 
is good policy.”); Karp, supra note 96, at 1559 (arguing “Article 17 ‘accident’ encompasses 
tortious actions of co-passengers”). 
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include all copassenger torts.110  For example, the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania stated that the “premise that an accident under the Warsaw 
Convention includes, as a matter of law, an assault committed upon a seated 
Plaintiff by a fellow airline passenger is inaccurate.”111 
However, courts using the broad “accident” definition, finding it 
irrelevant whether an accident is a risk inherent in air travel or causally 
related to the plane’s operation, implicitly allow for air carrier liability in all 
copassenger torts.112  Under this broad definition, any injury that occurs on 
an airplane implicates carriers solely because it occurred during air 
travel.113  For instance, the Northern District of California held Singapore 
Airlines liable for a passenger’s foot injury caused by another passenger 
stepping on his foot.114  The carrier was held liable even though it could not 
possibly have prevented the incident, because it occurred before takeoff 
when passengers were allowed to walk around the plane.115 
Some courts, while adhering to a narrower “accident” definition, do so in 
a way that makes air carriers liable for basically all copassenger torts.116  
Interpreting the narrowing requirement without considering American tort 
law causation principles essentially swallows the narrowing factor itself.117  
This liability extent is far beyond the Saks definition or what the Warsaw 
and Montreal Conventions’ makers intended, considering they created the 
conventions to limit airline liability.118  In addition, these far-reaching 
decisions contradict a fundamental tort liability principle—that people 
should be responsible only for injuries they should have and could have 
prevented.119 
Part III reexamines the logic in Saks, cases interpreting Saks, and the 
conventions’ legislative histories.  This reconsideration indicates that article 
17 accidents must stem from incidents causally connected to aircraft 
 
 110. See Karp, supra note 96, at 1560. 
 111. O’Grady v. British Airways, 134 F. Supp. 2d 407, 412 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 112. See, e.g., Barratt v. Trin. & Tobago (BWIA Int’l) Airways Corp., No. CV 88-3945 
(RR), 1990 WL 127590, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990) (holding that a plaintiff’s injury 
sustained on an airport staircase constituted an article 17 accident even though the stairs 
were not causally tied to the air craft’s operation). 
 113. See, e.g., Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 114. See Kwon v. Sing. Airlines, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 115. The court called the narrowing factors “glosses . . . not contained in Article 17 or in 
Saks.” Id. at 1045. 
 116. See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000) (Pooler, J., 
concurring). 
 117. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 17 (“By [the court’s] rationale [in Wallace], the airline 
is at fault for co-passenger torts simply because it transports passengers.”).  In fact, one 
scholar asserts that, because the Wallace Court could not find any event in the chain of 
causation that fit the Saks definition, it “strained . . . taking the term ‘accident’ far beyond its 
original purpose or intention.” Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger 
Disturbances Under the Warsaw Convention, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 891, 966 (2001); see 
also supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text; see also Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 
392, 407 (1985) (“[S]ome commentators have characterized the [Montreal] Agreement as 
imposing ‘absolute’ liability on air carriers. . . .  [This] characterization is not entirely 
accurate.”); Pastor, supra note 32, at 582. 
 119. See supra note 16. 
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operation and therefore do not encompass all copassenger torts.  The 
legislative history and relevant cases all point to using American tort 
principles in interpreting article 17 accidents—a strategy many courts avoid 
because of the conventions’ roles as exceptions to American tort 
jurisprudence.120 
III.  ARTICLE 17 ACCIDENTS REINTERPRETED 
An analysis of the Saks holding and a closer reading of the Montreal and 
Warsaw Conventions indicate that in order to be an article 17 accident, 
there must be a clear causal connection between the injury and the operation 
of the aircraft.  This conflates the two most frequently considered narrowing 
factors (causal connection to aircraft operation and inherent air travel risks) 
because, to be a risk inherent in air travel, such a risk must logically have a 
causal connection to the travel.121  To hold these narrowing requirements as 
unnecessary “would be effectively to construe the Convention as a statute 
imposing absolute liability for any harmful occurrence on an international 
flight,” and, as one district court noted, “there is neither a reason nor 
authority for such a construction.”122  In addition, reexamining these 
sources indicates that, although the conventions were created as a deviation 
from tort liability, it is appropriate and in line with precedent to use these 
tort principles in interpreting the conventions.123 
Part III.A reexamines the Saks decision and the conventions’ legislative 
histories to demonstrate that a causal connection to aircraft operation is 
necessary for an incident to be an article 17 accident.  Then, it discusses 
why the causal limit on air carrier liability is good policy.  Part III.B 
analyzes the Saks decision, its progeny, and the conventions’ legislative 
history to highlight the creators’ intent to analyze causation in light of tort 
precedent.  Finally, Part III.C delineates what kinds of copassenger torts 
should be considered “accidents” under the Montreal Convention. 
A.  No Indemnification Without Causation:  
The Necessity for an Accident 
to Be Causally Connected to the Aircraft 
The Saks decision unequivocally rejects the idea that the conventions 
impose absolute liability on international air carriers for passengers’ 
injuries.124  Instead, the Court found that the accident must be unusual or 
 
 120. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 121. See supra note 104. 
 122. Gotz v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D. Mass. 1998).  In order to 
come up with an equitable delineation of an article 17 accident, it is important to move away 
from the passengers’ point of view and instead focus on delineating what injuries are risks 
inherent in air travel or are actually caused by the operation of the aircraft. See supra notes 
90–95 and accompanying text. 
 123. See infra Part III.B. 
 124. See supra note 118. 
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unexpected to make the carrier liable.125  Part III.A.1 demonstrates that, 
albeit not explicitly, the Saks decision requires a happening to be causally 
connected to aircraft operation.  Part III.A.2 explains that the conventions’ 
legislative histories echo that requirement.  Finally, Part III.A.3 advocates 
for this causal necessity in light of policy considerations and the current 
state of the airline industry. 
1.  Saks’s Context and Treatment of Intention 
Point to the Necessity for Causal Connections 
Saks must be understood within its limited context to be correctly 
interpreted.126  The Court’s restrictive rather than expansive definition of 
“accident” is, as the First Circuit put it, “entirely understandable as Article 
17 provides for strict liability [for accidents], and there are sound policy 
reasons to confine that liability to the letter of the text, narrowly 
construed.”127  Saks never addressed whether an article 17 accident must be 
causally connected to the aircraft operation because it was never at issue; 
causation was “assumed or implicit in the decision” because the fact pattern 
was solely concerned with ear damage resulting from cabin 
depressurization—an injury clearly resulting from the operation of an 
aircraft.128  By deciding Saks based on the context before it, the Court did 
not intend to “expand ‘accident’ beyond the intent of the drafters, eliminate 
the need for there to be a connection between the injury producing event 
and an aspect of aviation or air craft operation, or render all passenger upon 
passenger torts actionable.”129 
In addition, the Saks Court explicitly decided against adding 
“unintended” or “unintentional” to the accident definition.130  This contrasts 
with the article 17 accident definitions adopted by some sister signatories to 
the conventions, like France, which require an incident be unintended to be 
an “accident.”131  It also contrasts with the normal English language 
 
 125. See Saks v. Air Fr., 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) (“We conclude that liability under 
Article 17 of the . . . Convention arises only if a passenger’s injury is caused by an 
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.”). 
 126. See id. at 396 (“The narrow issue presented is whether respondent can meet this 
burden by showing that her injury was caused by the normal operation of the aircraft’s 
pressurization system.”). But see Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 n.4 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (“It is not clear whether an event’s relationship to the operation of an aircraft is 
relevant to whether the event is an ‘accident.’”). 
 127. McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 316 (1st Cir. 1995) (asserting the 
Supreme Court generally interprets article 17 “parsimoniously”); see also infra Part III.B. 
 128. Weigand, supra note 117, at 938–39 (“Lost by many decisions since Saks is the 
undisputed fact that the abnormal operation of the aircraft was not at issue.”). 
 129. Id. at 938.  Weigand also mentions that, “[w]hile the exact origins of this 
[qualification] are not particularly clear[,] . . . it is derivative of the drafters’ intent to have 
the Convention pertain to aviation accidents.” Id. at 949. 
 130. Compare Saks, 470 U.S. at 399–400 (“[T]he word ‘accident’ is often used 
to . . . describe a cause of injury, and when the word is used in this . . . sense, it is usually 
defined as a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended event.”), with id. at 405 (“We 
conclude that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a 
passenger’s injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening.”). 
 131. See id. at 400 (defining the word “accident” in French). 
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accident definition, which is defined referring to intent; for example, 
Webster’s defines “accident” as a “happening that is not . . . intended.”132  
The element of intention, if included, should focus on the carrier’s 
perspective.133  Instead, the Saks Court chose to focus on a certain 
occurrence’s expectedness based on a reasonable passenger’s perspective 
and therefore did not assess the carrier’s fault.  This is seemingly contrary 
to the whole point of assigning liability—to make the person at fault pay for 
damages.134 
Leaving intention out of the accident inquiry does not fit within the 
Warsaw Convention because the line between limited and unlimited 
liability was explicitly drawn at willfulness.135  However, the Court 
continued to refine this fault analysis by noting that an article 17 accident 
does not occur if the injury results from a passenger’s internal reaction to 
the “normal operation of the plane.”136  This exception to the Saks 
definition’s language demonstrates that the Court viewed the fault element 
as causally connected to the plane’s operation.137 
The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) interpretation provides 
additional guidance.  The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that ICJ 
interpretations deserve “respectful consideration” by U.S. courts.138  The 
ICJ interpretation scheme, a model many courts around the world 
emulate,139 gives more priority (than the Supreme Court’s interpretation) to 
two principles:  the principle of the natural meaning and the principle of 
integration.140  The principle of the natural meaning provides that words 
and phrases are interpreted in their normal context, and the principle of 
integration advocates for interpreting treaties with continual reference to 
their purposes.141  As the entire Montreal Convention concerns air travel, it 
follows that all the articles and their words (such as “accident”) be 
interpreted within the airplane’s context.  Using this framework, a causal 
connection to the aircraft is necessary.  This causal connection can be 
 
 132. Accident, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1999); see also 
Accident, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015) (defining “accident” as “[a]n 
unfortunate incident that happens unexpectedly and unintentionally”). 
 133. The Warsaw Convention’s fault-based line drawing at willful misconduct versus 
negligence is indicative of the airline’s perspective, if perspective is relevant at all. See 
Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 12. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 25. 
 136. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 404. 
 137. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 13. 
 138. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 376 (2006). 
 139. See Melissa A. Waters, The U.S. Supreme Court and the International Court of 
Justice:  What Does “Respectful Consideration” Mean?, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES:  
THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 112, 113 (Cesare P.R. 
Romano ed., 2009) (discussing Justice Breyer’s conception that “U.S. courts should 
recognize the ICJ as an international tribunal with special expertise in matters of treaty 
interpretation”). 
 140. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice 1951–4:  Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 203 (1957). 
 141. See id. at 211, 223. 
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anything from an equipment malfunction to the actions of the airline 
employees; yet if an injury results from activity that has nothing whatsoever 
to do with the plane’s operation, it should not be classified an “accident” 
and expose carriers to liability.142  This causal necessity is echoed in the 
Warsaw Convention’s and Montreal Convention’s legislative histories. 
2.  The Conventions’ Legislative Histories 
Support a Mandated Causal Connection 
Treaty interpretation endeavors to give meaning to the drafters’ 
intentions.143  As such, courts “may look beyond the written words to the 
history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted 
by the parties” to more precisely understand the treaty’s purposes.144  
Because article 17 lacks substantive change from the Warsaw to the 
Montreal Convention, it is appropriate to look at both conferences’ 
legislative histories to gauge the intended air carrier liability limits.145 
These legislative histories indicate that the treaty creators presupposed an 
incident’s causal connection with the aircraft in qualifying it as an article 17 
accident and did not advocate for a strict liability standard.  The Warsaw 
Convention’s drafters were presented with two options for personal injury 
liability language:  a preliminary plan for their consideration created by a 
team of experts, the Comité International Technique d’Experts Juridique 
Aériens (CITEJA),146 and a draft developed at a previous conference, the 
Paris Protocol.147  Ultimately, the drafters chose the CITEJA proposal’s 
“narrower language” for liability, a choice from which the Supreme Court 
found it “reasonable to infer that the Conference adopted the narrower 
 
 142. This is in line with American tort jurisprudence. See infra Part III.B. 
 143. See Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d. Cir. 1962), aff’d, 373 U.S. 49 
(1963) (noting that courts strive to give “the specific words of a treaty a meaning consistent 
with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties”). 
 144. See Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943)); accord Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air 
Fr., 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is well established that treaty interpretation 
involves a consideration of legislative history and the intent of the contracting parties.”); Day 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1975); Block v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323, 336–38 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 145. See 149 CONG. REC. S10,870 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden) 
(“[A] large body of judicial precedents has developed during the[] seven decades [since the 
United States became a party to the Warsaw Convention].  The negotiators intended . . . to 
the extent applicable, to preserve these precedents.”); see also LARSEN ET AL., supra note 30, 
at 349 (“[E]fforts were made in the negotiations and drafting [of the Montreal Convention] 
to retain existing language and substance of other provisions to preserve judicial precedent 
relating to other aspects of the Warsaw Convention, in order to avoid unnecessary litigation 
over issues already decided by courts under the Warsaw Convention.” (quoting S. EXEC. REP. 
NO. 108-8 (2003) (statement of Hon. Jeffrey N. Shane))); see also supra note 67 and 
accompanying text. 
 146. See Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 382 (2d Cir. 2004); see also 
WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 257–68 (reprinting the preliminary draft); see also 
Pastor, supra note 32, at 578 (explaining CITEJA’s spatial, rather than fault-induced, 
liability impositions). 
 147. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 401 (“The treaty that became the Warsaw Convention was first 
drafted at an international conference in Paris in 1925.”). 
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language [of the CITEJA proposal] to limit the types of recoverable 
injuries.”148 
Finally, the writings of Dieter Goedhuis, the Warsaw Convention’s 
official reporter, insisted the drafters’ clear intention was that air carriers be 
freed from strict liability for passenger injuries, writing that “the carrier 
does not guarantee safety; he is only obliged to take all the measures which 
a good carrier would take for the safety of his passengers.”149  Goedhuis 
necessitated causal connection to the aircraft even in the specific case of 
copassenger torts:  “In [a case] . . . in which a passenger is injured in a fight 
with another passenger, it would be unjustifiable to declare the carrier liable 
by virtue of Article 17, because the accident which caused the damage had 
no relation with the operation of the aircraft.”150  A second look at the 
Warsaw Convention’s legislative history and the Saks interpretation of that 
history and language indicate that causal connections are necessary between 
an incident and injury to qualify as an article 17 accident. 
3.  Necessitating an Accident’s Causal Connection 
Is Good Policy 
Airlines need protection, and mandating a causal connection with the 
aircraft to classify injuries as article 17 accidents is an incredibly protective 
measure.  Commercial air carriage is a fragile industry151 in need of 
governmental safeguards for multiple reasons:  small airlines need 
protections to grow in a competitive market dominated by large 
international airlines and large airlines need financial safeguards to continue 
providing services because of the insecure status of the airline industry. 
Unfortunately, today’s Montreal Convention scheme does not provide 
this protection.  As one author put it, “[T]he combination between the 
Montreal Convention’s expansion of liability and the precedents developed 
under Article 17 has the potential to harm the viability of commercial air 
travel.”152  Requiring a causal connection limits air carrier liability to 
certain situations153 instead of inundating them with responsibility for any 
injury that occurs on a plane.  Courts arguing otherwise “fail[] to take 
account of the fact that the same risk occurs in every other walk of life” and 
 
 148. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 543 (1991); accord Sokol, supra note 41, at 
249 (noting that the Warsaw Convention’s article 24(2) limiting language, which reviews 
damage limits, refers only to cases where an “accident” causes an injury, and therefore 
“logically implies that there are cases not covered by Article 17”). 
 149. DIETER GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 200 
(1937). 
 150. Id.; see also Price v. British Airways, No. 91 Civ. 4947 (JFK), 1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9581, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1992). 
 151. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 152. Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 25.  This is especially true under the Montreal 
Convention’s monetary two-tier scheme, where airlines are extremely vulnerable in the 
lower tier. Id. 
 153. These situations end up being ones in which the airline is in the best position to 
mitigate risks, in line with American tort jurisprudence. See infra Part III.C. 
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unreasonably extend air carrier liability past notions of premises liability for 
torts occurring on land.154 
The Montreal Convention applies to small airlines as well as large 
international ones.155  Many assume the Convention only applies to large 
international air carriers, but in fact, the Convention applies to any carrier 
on a passenger’s itinerary if the itinerary includes at least two stopping 
points in different sovereigns’ territories.156  This means the Montreal 
Convention can cover any airline, even a domestic one.157  For example, a 
passenger goes from London to New York, then changes planes and goes 
on a different airline’s flight from New York to Washington.  The Montreal 
Convention would apply if that passenger were injured on the second, 
purely domestic flight, even if that airline had never sent a plane outside 
U.S. borders.158  Notably, “the Montreal Convention has a broader reach 
than a first glance would reveal.”159  Small domestic airlines need 
protection to compete in the oligarchic commercial air travel industry.160 
In addition, even bigger airlines—who some assume “are in a position to 
distribute among all passengers what would otherwise be a crushing burden 
upon those few unfortunate enough to become ‘accident’ victims”161—need 
protection due to the commercial air industry’s fragile economic state and 
“weak profitability.”162  Even though today’s international air travel 
contributes significantly to the world economy, there is a “mismatch 
between the value that the industry contributes to economies and the 
rewards that it generates” for investors and the airlines themselves.163  Even 
the International Air Transport Association’s president concedes that all 
 
 154. MONTREAL CONVENTION, ch. III, art. 17, para. 20 (Elmar Giemulla & Ronald 
Schmid eds., 2011); supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 155. The Montreal Convention applies to all “international carriage of persons, baggage 
or cargo performed by aircraft.” Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 1.1. 
 156. See id. art. 1.2.  Any carrier on the itinerary is covered regardless of whether there is 
a break in the travel, different airlines are involved, or the sovereigns on the itinerary have 
signed the Convention. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 5. 
 157. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 6 (“[A]n airline that is domestic in the sense of 
deriving most of its profits from flights within the same country may easily enter into the 
international carriage arena, by virtue of the contracts into which it enters.”). 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Evelyn D. Sahr & Drew M. Derco, Airlines Need Protection Too, 26 AIR & 
SPACE L. 1, 4 (2013) (“Airlines (particularly smaller airlines) do not have the capability to 
prevent all such errors [and] . . . [t]he financial cost of such an error could be devastating, 
particularly for smaller airlines.”); see also Brise, supra note 66, at 128 (noting that 
indemnification under the Montreal Convention has the potential to bankrupt sovereign 
states if brought against small state-owned carriers). 
 161. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34 (2d. Cir. 1975).  Recently, US 
Airways and American Airlines merged and created the world’s largest airline to compete 
with other airlines that had benefitted from “megamerger[s].” See American Airlines Bulks 
Up, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/15/opinion/american-
airlines-bulks-up.html [https://perma.cc/BG84-XK6R]. 
 162. See The State of Airline Industry, 100 Years In, SKIFT (June 2, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://skift.com/2014/06/02/the-state-of-airline-industry-100-years-in/ (“With a net profit 
margin of just 2.4%, airlines will retain only $5.42 per passenger carried.”) 
[https://perma.cc/FP8U-RHLC]; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 163. See The State of Airline Industry, 100 Years In, supra note 162. 
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airlines need governments to enact “regulatory structure[s] that facilitate[] 
[their] success” and curb liability.164 
Also, the United States’s continued signatory status to the Montreal 
Convention echoes the legislature’s insistence that airlines are persistently 
in need of liability protection.  It is not for the judicial but rather the 
legislative and executive branches to evaluate whether air carriers should be 
strictly liable for injuries that occur on planes or whether air carriers are in a 
state to do so.165  The concerns of the Warsaw Convention’s creators are 
still just as paramount today, one hundred years after the creation of air 
travel, as they were at the dawn of the industry.  For example, after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization Act, which capped liability claims against 
airlines that arose from the attacks.166  Although a domestic action, the 
legislation limiting liability was enacted to prevent the airline industry’s 
collapse.167  As one scholar put it, “These [more recent] measures 
demonstrate that the limits on recovery for claims against the airlines are 
not relics of the past.”168 
Because causal connections between incidents and injuries are necessary 
in article 17 accident inquiries, courts must uniformly interpret these 
connections’ sufficiency.  They can do so while remaining consistent with 
the intent of the conventions’ creators by using tort law notions of 
negligence, proximate causation, and foreseeability. 
B.  General Tort Principles Are Necessary 
to Analyze Causal Connections 
The causal connections between injuries and aircraft operation should be 
analyzed with general tort principles.  Part III.B.1 illustrates how the 
conventions, their legislative history, and their subsequent interpretation do 
not exclude using tort law.  In fact, the sources seem to advocate using it.  
Part III.B.2 then applies tort principles to a particular Supreme Court case, 
Olympic Airways v. Husain,169 and demonstrates how using tort law to 
interpret causal connections removes some of the subjective fact-based 
inquiry and ambiguity as to what is and what is not an article 17 accident 
throughout U.S. courts, while maintaining the purpose of the Montreal 
Convention. 
 
 164. See id. (“Governments should understand that the real value of aviation is the global 
connectivity it provides and the growth and development it stimulates, not [wealth] . . . that 
can be extracted from it.”). 
 165. See In re Aircrash in Bali on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308–09 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that the airline industry is no longer in its infancy, but insisting that a court 
interpreting a treaty like the Warsaw Convention must “studiously avoid imposing its own 
view of foreign policy objectives and must accept [those] . . . of the executive and legislative 
branches”). 
 166. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 
Stat. 230 (2001). 
 167. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 8. 
 168. Id. 
 169. 540 U.S. 644 (2004). 
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1.  Tort Law Is Not Precluded from Accident Analysis 
Simply because the Montreal Convention is an exception to tort 
principles does not mean courts cannot use these principles to interpret the 
extent of this exception.  Although the accident requirement is a departure 
from the foundational tort principle of full compensation for injury victims 
because it limits a claimant’s ability to recover if the injury does not fit 
within the requirement (therefore leaving some people without a valid claim 
under the Convention),170 this does not preclude tort law’s use to figure out 
what constitutes an “accident.”  Doing so is consistent with the 
conventions’ creators’ intentions, subsequent U.S. cases interpreting Saks, 
and domestic flight liability standards. 
In fact, the Warsaw Convention “based its approach toward air carrier 
liability on the fault theory of tort.”171  Its creators uniformly spoke of 
rendering air carriers responsible only for injuries they could have 
reasonably prevented.172  For instance, the original Warsaw Convention 
provided as a valid defense that air carriers took all necessary measures to 
avoid the damage.173  Courts hold the “all necessary measures” defense 
should be interpreted as “all reasonable measures,”174 based on the 
reasonableness idea embodied in tort law.  This is in line with tort 
negligence principles implicating only those who have committed a wrong 
or have failed to protect people for whom they are responsible from injury 
sources relatively under their control.175  It is also consistent with American 
airline liability legislation outside the Montreal Convention, which states, 
 
 170. In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 625, 631 
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the Warsaw Convention’s limit is a “statutory departure” from 
the idea of full compensation for tort victims, a “conceptual underpinning[] of modern 
American tort law”); see also JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 3–5 (9th ed. 1983); 
Abeyratne, supra note 54, at 256 (“It is an incontrovertible principle of tort law that tortious 
liability exists primarily to compensate the victim by compelling the wrongdoer to pay for 
the damage he has done.”); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and 
Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1135 (2007) (observing that tort law “is a law that 
empowers victims to respond to wrongdoers whose wrongs have injured them”). 
 171. Abeyratne, supra note 54, at 256. See generally Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Liability 
for Personal Injury and Death Under the Warsaw Convention and Its Relevance to Fault 
Liability in Tort Law, 21 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 1 (1996).  It is interesting how industrial 
growth fuels legislation:  the Montreal Convention and Warsaw Convention created the 
“accident” requirement to protect the young airline industry, while the fundamental fault and 
negligence principles upon which the conventions were created themselves came from the 
eighteenth century need to protect new industries from previous tort law’s strict liability 
scheme. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 30 (1972) 
(observing that the underpinning of American tort jurisprudence developed itself to subsidize 
“the expanding industries of the nineteenth century”). 
 172. See supra note 95; see also Lowenfeld & Mendehlson, supra note 28, at 500; supra 
note 49 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 20. 
 174. See, e.g., Obuzor v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 0224 (JSM), 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5317, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999). 
 175. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 170, at 1123–24 (“On its face, tort law is a law 
of wrongs.  The word ‘tort’ means wrong. . . .  Substantive tort doctrine is filled with rules 
and concepts that express the idea of one person wronging another.”); see also supra note 16 
and accompanying text. 
2016] DEFINING “ACCIDENTS” IN THE AIR 1491 
“A carrier of passengers by airplane is not an insurer of the passengers’ 
safety, and its liability for injury to or the death of a passenger must be 
based upon some negligence or fault for which the carrier is 
responsible.”176 
Additionally, to bolster their holdings’ validity, U.S. courts point out 
their decisions’ consistency with American tort jurisprudence.177  One can 
view Saks’s “unusual or unexpected” measure as embracing tort law’s 
integral accident inquiry role because it brings in an element of 
foreseeability.178  Courts also have explicitly held that whether claimants 
are “entitled to assert the Warsaw Convention [causes of action]” and what 
their respective rights are should “be determined by reference to other 
federal statutes”—the majority of which are based on foundational tort 
jurisprudence.179  In fact, the Second Circuit has explicitly “adopt[ed] the 
federal common law of torts to construe the [Montreal] Convention.”180 
As such, liability limitations in tort law—including ideas of contributory 
negligence, reasonableness, and foreseeability—should apply to whether 
incidents are considered within the definition of an article 17 accident.  The 
Saks holding, the legislative histories of the conventions, and subsequent 
interpretation of the conventions all support a requirement that an 
“accident” be (1) an unusual or unexpected happening, (2) external to the 
passenger, (3) causally connected to the operation of an aircraft, and (4) 
consistent with common law tort jurisprudence evaluating the causal 
connection.  This definition, albeit abstract, removes some of the subjective 
fact-based inquiry and ambiguity as to what is and is not a Montreal 
Convention article 17 accident throughout U.S. courts.  This is illustrated in 
 
 176. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 116 (2015); see also Magan v. Lufthansa German 
Airlines, 339 F.3d 158, 162 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Courts have theorized that one of the 
guiding principles that pervades, and arguably explains, the original Convention, the 
subsequent modifications, and even the Court’s decision in Saks, is an apportionment of risk 
to the party best able to control it . . . .”). 
 177. See, e.g., Day v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting 
that its decision indemnifying Trans World Air is consistent with “modern [tort] theories of 
accident cost allocation”); In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc., 778 F. 
Supp. 625, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the Court’s decision in E. Airlines, Inc. v. 
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991), is “consistent with American tort law”). 
 178. See Pastor, supra note 32, at 580–81 (“[The Saks] result is fully consistent with U.S. 
tort law. . . .  [A]llowing such claims in the absence of a federal tort law would run counter 
to the primary purpose of the Warsaw Convention—providing uniformity in the law 
governing international air transportation.”). 
 179. See In re Inflight Explosion, 778 F. Supp. at 632 (quoting In re Mex. City Aircrash 
of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 415 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2012) (premising the ability of a victim to sue government on tort 
principles, including negligence and foreseeability); Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 
1908, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (rendering employers liable for tortious activity and using tort 
tenets such as negligence and proximate cause). 
 180. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 
1991) (“[B]ecause air carrier liability is a uniquely international problem requiring uniform 
interpretation, the Convention must be interpreted according to federal common law.”); see 
id. at 1279 (“[W]e look to the common law of tort in order to determine the elements of the 
cause of action under the Convention.”). But see Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 301 
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding an airline liable for a sexual assault even though the assault was not 
proximately caused by the operation of the aircraft). 
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the Supreme Court decision Olympic Airways v. Husain,181 described 
further below. 
2.  Applying Tort Principles to Article 17 Analyses:  
A Reexamination of Olympic Airways v. Husain 
In Husain, the Supreme Court held Olympic Airways liable for a 
passenger’s death from smoke exposure after a flight attendant refused to 
move him away from the smoking section.182  The Court, petitioner, and 
respondent all focused on the flight attendant’s refusal to move the 
passenger’s seat and viewed the relevant question of law as whether a 
failure to act could constitute an “accident.”183  Both parties denounced 
using a negligence inquiry into whether the incident was an article 17 
accident and instead focused on the Saks unusual or unexpected measure.184  
This ignores the Saks’s implication that a causal connection to aircraft 
operation is necessary and that using tort law to interpret that causal 
requirement was not only permitted but also advocated by Saks, its progeny, 
and the conventions’ legislative histories.185 
Husain did not hold that omission could be considered an action in 
general, because the airline attendant’s refusal to move the decedent can be 
seen as an affirmative action, not an omission.186  However, the majority’s 
dicta noted that “the failure of an airline crew to take certain necessary vital 
steps could quite naturally and, in routine usage of the language, be an 
‘event or happening.’”187  In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia focused on 
the dangers of considering omissions as “accidents” for article 17 
analyses188:  it made carriers liable for anything that may occur on the plane 
whether or not the air carrier could have prevented it, which is far past what 
 
 181. 540 U.S. 644 (2004). 
 182. See id. at 647; accord Thomas Adam Peters, Olympic Airways v. Husain:  The 
United States Supreme Court Expands the Scope of an “Accident” for Purposes of Article 17 
of the Warsaw Convention and Consequently Contradicts Its Application of Multilateral 
International Treaty Interpretation, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 193, 201 (2006) (“The flight 
attendant told them they could switch seats if they were able to find another passenger 
willing to do the same.  The flight attendant refused to offer or provide any type of 
assistance.  As the smoke increased, [the decedent] walked to the front of the plane, visibly 
having difficulty breathing.”). 
 183. See DiGiacomo, supra note 96, at 439 & nn.251 & 260–61 (citing both petitioner’s 
and respondent’s briefs in Husain); see also Husain, 540 U.S. at 655–57 (discussing why a 
failure to act can be considered an “accident” under the Warsaw Convention). 
 184. See Husain, 540 U.S. at 654 (“The distinction between action and inaction, as 
petitioner uses these terms, would perhaps be relevant were this a tort law negligence case.  
But respondents do not advocate, and petitioner vigorously rejects, that a negligence regime 
applies under Article 17 of the Convention.”). 
 185. See Peters, supra note 182, at 202 (“The Court dismissed the action versus inaction 
distinction reasoning that Article 17 does not support the rules of an ordinary tort law 
negligence regime.”); see also supra Part III.B.1. 
 186. See Field, supra note 65, at 87 (noting the flight attendant’s rejection of an explicit 
request for assistance “was clearly something more than mere inaction”). 
 187. Husain, 540 U.S. at 656 n.10. 
 188. See Peters, supra note 182, at 205 (noting the dangers of the Husain decision, 
including that international air carriers are now “easy targets for passengers with a knack for 
creative legal schemes”). 
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legislators originally intended and which could potentially “transform the 
airline into an insurer for any harmful event.”189 
The focus in Husain should have been whether the causal connection to 
the aircraft operation—the flight attendant’s refusal to move the decedent—
was, within American tort jurisprudence, a legitimate proximate cause of 
the passenger’s injury.  If found a sufficient causal connection, the refusal 
would be an article 17 accident and make the carrier responsible for injuries 
resulting from that refusal; if not, Olympic Airways would not be liable for 
the passenger’s death. 
An accident analysis anchored in tort law would still find Olympic 
Airways liable while simultaneously solving the issue with which Scalia 
was so concerned—putting strict liability on airlines.190  In common law 
torts, a common carrier (like the owner of an airplane, a cruise ship, or a 
bus) is liable for injuries that are foreseeable and within the carrier’s ability 
to prevent.191  In Husain, the decedent asked multiple times to be moved 
away from the smoking section and explained to the stewardess why he was 
particularly sensitive to smoke.192  His injury was clearly foreseeable, and 
therefore the air carrier’s refusal to move him—the causal connection with 
his injury to the aircraft—was negligent and a legitimate proximate cause 
within tort jurisprudence.193  Because the airline attendant’s refusal to move 
him was (1) an unexpected and unusual occurrence, (2) external to the 
passenger,194 (3) causally connected to the passenger’s injury, and (4) the 
causal connection was sufficient according to common law tort 
jurisprudence, it falls within the “accident” definition of article 17. 
Using tort law to analyze Montreal Convention accident causal 
connections is a consistent and equitable strategy to impose liability on air 
carriers in line with the Convention’s creators’ intent.  It is a strategy that 
 
 189. Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 17; see also infra Part III.C.  Scalia noted that the Saks 
Court did not intend for omissions to be considered “accidents” by pointing out the two ways 
to define “accident.”  The first refers to something unintentional or not purposeful—in 
Scalia’s words, “as in, ‘the hundred typing monkeys’ verbatim reproduction of War and 
Peace was an accident.’” See Husain, 540 U.S. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The second 
refers to an unusual or unexpected event, whether intentional or not. See id.  The Supreme 
Court in Saks disregarded intention and chose the latter definition, and, as Scalia explained, 
“while there is no doubt that inaction can be an accident in the former sense . . . whether it 
can be so in the latter sense is questionable.” Id. 
 190. See Peters, supra note 182, at 193 (“Justice Scalia’s dissent in [Husain is] on point 
and more congruent not only with previous Supreme Court decisions, but also with the 
ultimate goal of the Warsaw Convention.”). 
 191. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 117 (2015) (“A common carrier owes a duty of 
utmost care and vigilance of a very cautious person towards its passengers.”); see also 
Wilbur J. Russ, Comment, Tort Liability of Air Carriers to Their Passengers, 39 CALIF. L. 
REV. 541, 542 (1951). 
 192. See Husain, 540 U.S. at 647–49. 
 193. See Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(“The air carrier . . . could not be reasonably expected to anticipate and protect against every 
cause of injury which results solely from a traveler’s internal reaction to normal flight 
operations or other like conditions peculiar to or uniquely known only by a particular 
passenger.”). 
 194. See DiGiacomo, supra note 96, at 441. 
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avoids sweeping fact-based holdings that further complicate accident cases 
and go against the American sense of integrity.195 
C.  What Copassenger Torts Are Article 17 Accidents? 
Understanding that a causal connection with aircraft operation is 
necessary for incidents to be Montreal Convention accidents and that the 
causal connection must be in line with tort jurisprudence simplifies 
analyzing whether airlines should be responsible for a copassenger tort.  In 
addition to this simplification, it allows copassenger tort cases a measure of 
predictability important to carriers, claimants, and governments.  This 
understanding also will keep copassenger tort decisions in line with the 
original Montreal Convention goal of protecting air carriers, while also 
incentivizing airlines to maintain diligent observation and security 
measures.196 
In tort jurisprudence, premises owners do not have a duty to protect 
people from others unless the owners see foreseeable indicators that another 
patron or a third party will inflict harm on one of its patrons; only then does 
a duty to act develop.197  Indicators of foreseeability include previous 
incidents by that patron or third party on the property.198  When an airplane 
is the tort’s premises, there is a minimal chance that a particular group of 
flight attendants will encounter a passenger they have previously seen 
commit a copassenger tort.  However, there remains a foreseeability 
requirement to implicate an airline for injuries sustained by passengers. 
For example, a fistfight between two sober passengers has nothing to do 
with aircraft operation, was not foreseeable, “nor may carriers easily guard 
against such a risk through the employment of protective security 
measures”; therefore air carriers should not be responsible for resulting 
injuries.199  This is in line with tort law common carrier liabilities and the 
duty to protect others from the conduct of third parties:  without an 
 
 195. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 170, at 1135–36 (explaining American law’s 
coupling of liability with a proximately caused wrongdoing in that “[t]ort law identifies 
domains of conduct that constitute a mistreatment of one person by another, such that the 
person who suffers the mistreatment is entitled to some sort of recourse against the 
wrongdoer”). 
 196. See Fulop, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (“[L]iability for accidents whose proximate ties to 
causation may be traced to some deviation from normal aircraft or airline operation or 
procedure would place the burden on the party best situated to know what went wrong, and 
most able to control, prevent and insure against the eventuality.”). 
 197. And therefore, by not acting, the premises owner will be held liable for the patron’s 
injuries. See, e.g., Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 113 P.3d 1159, 1168–69 (Cal. 2005) (noting 
that “only when ‘heightened’ foreseeability of third party criminal activity on the premises 
exists—shown by prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk 
of violent criminal assaults in that location—does the scope of a business proprietor’s 
special-relationship-based duty include an obligation”). 
 198. See id. 
 199. Price v. British Airways, No. 91 Civ. 4947 (JFK), 1992 WL 170679, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 6, 1992); see also Stone v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 823, 826–27 (D. Haw. 
1995) (holding that an airline was not liable for injuries sustained by a first-class passenger 
when punched by another passenger because the injury was not an “accident derived from air 
travel”). 
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incident’s foreseeability, there is no duty.200  However, when an airline’s 
attendant negligently violates the carrier’s policy by overserving alcoholic 
beverages to a passenger who then injures another passenger, the injury is 
causally connected enough to the aircraft to render the carrier responsible 
(because it is foreseeable that getting a passenger drunk will result in 
misbehavior).201 
Canonizing this “accident” definition would relieve airlines of liability 
for sexual assaults that occur on planes when alcohol was not served to the 
perpetrator and when there was no other foreseeability indicator for the 
assault.  In these situations, the air carrier is not involved in the chain of 
causation:  a sexual assault is not causally related to the operation of an 
aircraft.202  Courts would not have to use the shaky logic of Wallace v. 
Korean Air,203 which attributes usual and expected aspects of flights (e.g., 
close quarters, having lights off) to inherent air travel risks and therefore 
implicates the air carrier.204  The Wallace Court did not find the carrier 
liable for the sexual assault (which could be seen as “internal” to the pair of 
passengers) but rather for the “characteristics of air travel [that] increased 
[Wallace’s] vulnerability to assault.”205  If courts were to continue using the 
Wallace logic, it would force airlines to, in order to escape liability, keep 
the lights illuminated on long flights and require passengers to stay 
awake—both conditions that would likely increase air rage and create more 
copassenger torts—bad for airlines, passengers, safety, and policy.206 
CONCLUSION 
Protecting airlines, and the legislative histories corroborating this goal, 
should not be shunted aside in favor of a broader interpretation of the 
conventions forcing air carriers to compensate victims for any injury 
occurring on a plane.  Airlines should not be strictly liable for injuries that 
occur onboard:  nothing in the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions’ histories 
nor in the tort jurisprudence surrounding them indicates otherwise.  The 
 
 200. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 201. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., No. M-82-3057, 1983 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17951, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 1983) (finding that, when a passenger was overserved 
alcohol, fell on another passenger, and injured the second passenger, it was an article 17 
accident). But see Lahey v. Sing. Airlines, Ltd., 115 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(noting that “the actions of the crew are not relevant to the determination of whether [an] 
assault was an ‘accident’”). 
 202. See Wallace v. Korean Air, No. 98 Civ. 1039 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312, at 
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999) (finding that a sexual assault by a copassenger was not an 
article 17 accident because “[a]n event cannot fall within the operation of the aircraft if that 
event is not within the airline’s purview or control”); see also Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 17. 
But see Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2000) (allowing a sexual 
assault claim to survive solely because the perpetrator was overserved alcohol, noting that 
“[w]ithout the allegation of over-serving, . . . American could not bear any causal 
responsibility for Langadino’s injuries and there would be no Warsaw Convention 
accident”). 
 203. No. 98 Civ. 1039 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999). 
 204. See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 205. See id. at 294. 
 206. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 17–18. 
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subsequent interpretation of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, both 
created to protect airlines, has distorted the accident requirement to hold air 
carriers responsible beyond the limits to which they would be held 
accountable by tort jurisprudence. 
In order to be an article 17 accident, an incident must be (1) unusual or 
unexpected, (2) external to the passenger, (3) causally connected to the 
operation of the aircraft, and (4) the causal connection must be sufficient 
under a traditional tort law evaluation.  Using this definition makes sure that 
courts are ruling in a manner consistent with Saks, the conventions’ 
legislative histories, and notions of responsibility and morality.  This 
definition is especially helpful in analyzing copassenger torts, where the 
causal connections are intricate and where American tort jurisprudence has 
a rich history of assigning liability to the premises owner or other actors.  
Ultimately, this narrower definition of article 17 accidents gives courts, 
airlines, and claimants their deserved predictability, protection, and justice. 
